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Abstract 
To efficiently control a process, accurate sensor measurements must be provided of the signals used by the 
controller to decide which actions to actuate in order to maintain the system in the desired conditions. Noisy 
or faulty sensors must, then, be promptly detected and their signals corrected in order to avoid wrong control 
decisions. In this work, sensor diagnostics is tackled within an ensemble of Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) models whose outcomes are aggregated by means of a local fusion (LF) strategy. The aggregated 
model thereby obtained is used for both the early detection and identification of faulty sensors, and for 
correcting their measured values. The fault detection decision logic is based on the Sequential Probability 
Ratio Test (SPRT). The proposed approach is demonstrated on a simulated case study concerning the 
pressure and level control in the pressurizer of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). The obtained results 
show the possibility to achieve an adequate control of the process even when a sensor failure occurs. 
1 Introduction 
When a fault occurs in a sensor whose measurements are used for the control of an industrial process, a 
repair action must be promptly initiated since the use of incorrect information by the controller could 
compromise the correct functioning of the process, with potential fallbacks both on production and safety. In 
this context, on-line monitoring methods can provide an indication of the health of the sensors and supply an 
early warning of incipient faults, thus enabling to assess the reliability of the measurement and to 
opportunely plan the sensor maintenance. Additionally, for continuing operation while reparation is 
performed, the erroneous measurements should be substituted by accurate estimates of the signal true values.  
The main objective of this work is to devise an on-line monitoring scheme to reduce the effects of sensor 
faults on the process control, by detecting the faults and by reconstructing the correct signal values. Three 
steps are envisaged: (a) validate the sensor measurements, (b) detect and identify faults and (c) reconstruct 
the correct values of the faulty signals. Steps (a) and (c) can be performed by resorting to a model that 
generates estimates of the correct sensors signal values based on actual readings and correlations among 
them; step (b) can be performed by a fault detection and identification module which determines, as early as 
possible, whether the sensors are behaving anomalously and identifies the faulty ones among them. 
Concerning the development of a signal validation and reconstruction model, a common approach is that of 
using auto-associative models (Hoffmann, 2006; Holbert and Upadhyaya, 1990; Roverso et al., 2007). The 
practical problem, however, is that a single auto-associative model cannot handle the multiplicity of signals 
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measured on a real plant (Baraldi et al., 2008; Fantoni and Mazzola, 1996; 0Fantoni et al., 2003; Zio et al., 
2007). A possible way to overtake this limitation is to subdivide the signals into small overlapping groups, 
develop an ensemble of models, one for each group, and finally combine their outcomes. Key to building of 
the ensemble is the diversity of the individual models. In the approach investigated in this work, diversity is 
promoted by randomly generating the signals groups according to the Random Feature Selection Ensemble 
(RFSE) technique (Bryll et al., 2003); this is a completely random technique in which no optimization of the 
composition of the individual groups is sought, i.e., no relevance is given, for example, to the correlation 
between the signals in the groups or to their capability of reconstruction. The groups thereby created are used 
to develop a corresponding number of signal validation and reconstruction PCA models (Jolliffe, 2002; 
Diamantaras and Kung, 1996; Scholkopf et al., 1999; Moore, 1981). The outcomes of different models are 
then aggregated using a LF method (Baraldi et al., 2009; Bonissone et al., 2008). To improve the accuracy of 
the reconstruction, past signal measurements are used as further input to the models and the reconstruction of 
the faulty signals is iterated until satisfactory convergence. 
The detection and identification of a sensor fault can be achieved by comparing the actual sensor 
measurements with the signal values estimated by the signal validation and reconstruction model; in this 
work, the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) which considers the statistical properties of the residual, 
i.e. the difference between the measurements and their estimation, is used. 
The proposed approach has been applied to a case study concerning the level and pressure control in the 
pressurizer of a PWR nuclear power plant. In order to test the effectiveness of the described procedure, faults 
have been added to sensors whose signals are simulated using a Matlab SIMULINK model of the 
pressurizer. Upon fault detection, the reconstructed value of the faulty signal is used by the controller to 
decide the control action. A comparison is made of the control performance obtained when feeding the 
controller with the measurements coming from the faulty sensor or the reconstructed values. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 states the problems of fault detection, 
identification and signal reconstruction in the frame of process control; Section 3 describes the signal 
validation module, recalling briefly the RFSE and LF techniques; Section 4 describes the SPRT technique 
implemented in the fault detection module; Section 5 presents the results from a set of experiments 
concerning the control of a simulated PWR pressurizer in presence of faults of the sensors; finally, Section 6 
presents the conclusions and describes potential future directions of research. 
2 Sensor  fault  detection,  identification  and  signal  reconstruction  for 
process control  
The objective of a controller is to correct the mismatch between the true values TiCf  of Cn  plant variables and 
their reference values (setpoints) RefiCf  by establishing and actuating corrective actions. In order to decide 
the opportune control actions, the controller considers the available information describing the state of the 
process to be controlled. Let us assume that this information is characterized by the measured values 
Iif  of 
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In  plant signals, hereafter called controller input signals. For efficient control of the process, the controller 
should be fed with the best available estimate of the true values TiIf , I,...,ni 1  of each controller input 
signal. Since a sensor measurement 
Iif  provides an estimate of the true value 
T
iIf of the physical quantity 
used by the controller, ideally it should be Tii II ff  , but in practice the measurement Iif  is affected by 
random noise and sometimes it also deviates from the true value TiIf because of a sensor fault. 
Fig. 1: fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction strategy in case of sensor faults; the black bullet indicates 
a fault. 
 
Fig. 1 shows the general framework adopted to address the problem of detecting and identifying faults in the 
sensors measuring the controller input signals 
Iif , and eventually reconstructing their correct values 
T
iIf .  
Let us assume that n  signals of the process under analysis are measured and let if  be the measurement of 
the generic i -th signal, ni ,...,1 ; notice that the In  controller input signals are contained in this set of n  
signals. The n  measured signals if  are processed by a signal validation and reconstruction model which 
provides a first estimate 1ifˆ  of the true signal value 
T
if  based on the correlation existing between the n  
measured signals. These correlations are “learned” by the model from a “training” data set TRNX  containing 
faults-free measurements of the n  signals recorded during normal operation of the system.  
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In order to catch the dynamic evolution of the system and increase the robustness of the method, the set of 
measurements if  which are given in input to the signal validation and reconstruction model is constituted 
not only by the current values )t(fi  of the n  measured signals, but also by the Tn   values 
)Tt(f),...,t(f ii 1  measured in a sliding window of T  previous time instants (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2: inputs and outputs of the signal validation and reconstruction model. 
 
The ? estimates )t(fˆ 1i  generated by the signal validation and reconstruction model are compared with the 
measured values )t(fi  of the current signals values )t(f
T
i  and the residuals )t(fˆ)t(f)t(e
1
iii   are used 
as input to the fault detection module. By monitoring the evolution of the statistical properties of the 
residuals ie , the conditions of the sensors are verified and an indication about their state of health is 
obtained. When one or more sensors are diagnosed as faulty, their measurements are not reliable and should 
be substituted by the estimates produced by the validation and reconstruction model. However, since the 
estimates 1ifˆ  produced by the signal validation and reconstruction model can be themselves affected by the 
incorrect values in input, the reconstruction Tifˆ  of a faulty measurement if  is obtained by iterating the 
signal reconstruction a number iterN  of times (Chevalier et al., 2009): at each iteration j , the i -th input to 
the signal validation and reconstruction model is the reconstructed value 1jif
ˆ  of the faulty signal if  
obtained at the previous iteration 1j . After the iterations are completed, the reconstructed value )t(fˆ Ti  is 
used as corrected input to the signal validation and reconstruction model, and also to the controller if if  is 
one of its inputs, in substitution of the erroneous measurement until maintenance of the faulty sensor is 
performed. 
3 Signal validation and reconstruction model 
3.1 The Random Feature Selection Ensemble approach 
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Fig. 3 reports a sketch of the flow of modelling for signal reconstruction. A set of )(TnnT 1  signals
)Tt(f),...,t(f),t(f iii 1 , n,...,i 1  is available for building the signal validation and reconstruction model. 
Given the typically large value of Tn , a single model cannot perform the reconstruction task with the desired 
accuracy and reliability; then, the signal set must be partitioned into subsets, for each of which a 
reconstruction model is built. Actually, in the ensemble approach here proposed the subsets of signals are 
overlapping (i.e., two subsets may contain signals which are the same), a PCA model is built for each subset 
and the reconstruction of a signal contained in different models is obtained by aggregating their outcomes, 
within an ensemble approach. 
In this work, signal grouping is performed by the RFSE technique which consists in randomly sampling from 
the Tn  available signals, with replacement, H  subsets hF , H1h ,..., , each constituted by m  signals 
(Bryll et al., 2003). This guarantees high signal diversity in the overlapping groups upon which the PCA 
models are built and allows for rapid construction of the signal groups. Furthermore, randomly selecting the 
signals in the groups with a reasonable choice of the group size parameters m  and H , can basically 
guarantee coverage of all the signals in the ensemble with adequate redundancy (Aly and Atiya, 2006; Bryll 
et al., 2003).  
As mentioned above, the H  diverse signal groups generated are used as bases for developing a 
corresponding number of PCA validation and reconstruction models. To do this, the data set X  of N  signal 
patterns available is partitioned into a training set TRNX  (made of TRNN  patterns) and a test set TSTX  (made 
of TSTN  patterns); the former is used to train the individual models, whereas the latter is used to verify the 
ensemble performance in the signal reconstruction task in order to determine the optimal values of 
parameters m  and H  (Baraldi et al., 2009a). The models thus obtained are then used online for the signal 
validation and reconstruction process.  
Each signal if  is present in a number iH  of groups and thus a corresponding number of individual PCA 
models provide its reconstruction. Different methods can be used to aggregate the outcomes of these 
individual models in the ensemble, in order to get the final reconstructed value. In this work a local fusion 
strategy has been adopted. 
After the ensemble of PCA models has been trained, it can be used to validate and reconstruct the actual 
sensors measurements: the entire set of Tn  signals is fed into the ensemble of models which returns their 
reconstructed values. In particular, each model h  receives in input and reconstructs only the signals 
belonging to the corresponding subset hF . Although the PCA auto-associative models of the ensemble 
reconstruct in output both current and past values of the measured signals in input, only the reconstructions 
)t(fˆi  of the current measurements are used in the subsequent steps of the control procedure; thus, the 
aggregation of only the reconstructions )t(fˆ hi  of the current signals values needs to be performed, with 
significant savings of computational time. 
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Fig. 3: approach to the reconstruction of signal if  contained in groups h,...,, FFF 175 . 
3.2 Local fusion strategies for models outcome aggregation 
Different techniques have been proposed for the aggregation of the outcomes of multiple models (Baraldi et 
al., 2009b; Bonissone et al., 2008). In general, the aggregation of the models outcomes requires to associate a 
weight hiw  and a bias correction 
h
ib  to the reconstruction hifˆ  of each model h . The idea is to correct the 
values of hifˆ  by subtracting the estimated bias 
h
ib  and to combine hifˆ  with the other models estimates by 
means of a weighted average: 

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The most common technique is the simple mean which assigns the same value to all weights and set to zero 
the bias corrections, i.e. wwhi  and 0bhi  ,  n,..,i 1  and iH,...,h 1 . In (Baraldi et al., 2009b) it has 
been shown that the ensemble performance can be increased if both the bias corrections hib  and the weights 
h
iw  are computed locally, i.e., they vary as a function of the position of the pattern under reconstruction. In 
this way the two parameters hib  and 
h
iw  can account for the variation of models performances in the 
different regions of the signals space. Fig. 4 shows the overall framework for the reconstruction of the 
generic signal if  by local fusion of the models outcomes. 
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Fig. 4: framework of the locally weighted fusion of model outcomes. 
 
The main steps of the local fusion process are: 
1) Retrieve a set TRNQ  of neighbours of the pattern under reconstruction from the set of training patterns. 
According to the k -nn-based neighbourhood approach here adopted (Bonissone et al., 2008), TRNQ  is 
formed by the k  training patterns nearest to the test pattern (Fig. 5). The optimal number k  of nearest 
neighbours to be considered is obtained verifying the LF performance on the test set TSTX . 
 
Fig. 5: k -nn-based neighborhood. The black circle represents the test pattern; the other circles are training patterns. 
 
2) Associate a weight and a bias to each individual model of the ensemble depending on its reconstruction 
accuracy on the retrieved neighbours. According to (Baraldi et al., 2009b), the local bias correction hib  
and the local weight hiw  to be assigned to model h  in the reconstruction of signal if  are set equal to:  
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where hQ,i TRNme  represents the local mean error and hQ,i TRNmae  the local mean absolute error computed on 
a different dataset than the one used for the training of the models. The new data set is built by adding an 
artificial noise to the training data before their reconstruction; in this way, the training error used to 
estimate the weights will also account for the robustness of the model, thus keeping us from assigning 
high weights to models whose outstanding performance on the training set is not due to their real quality, 
but rather derives from overfitting. 
3) Aggregate the outputs by using eq. (1), which accounts for the models weights and bias.  
4 Statistical decision logic for fault detection 
The detection of a sensor fault is often achieved by comparison between the actual sensor measurement 
)t(f i  and the measurement estimate )t(fˆ
1
i  provided by a signal validation and reconstruction model which 
reproduces the response of the sensor in non-faulty conditions. Many techniques are based on the monitoring 
of the residual signal )t(fˆ)t(f)t(e 1iii   (Gross and Kumenik, 1991), for detecting a fault when the 
residual exceeds a threshold value previously set. To provide the earliest possible indication of a process 
anomaly, many techniques adopt the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) (Wald, 1947) to detect changes 
over time in the statistical characteristics of the residual signal ie  (Gross and Kumenik, 1991). 
The fault detection module implemented in this work also adopts the SPRT and not just for signalling the 
occurrence of a fault when the residual exceeds the threshold value, but also to return in output the condition 
of the sensors, by performing a statistical hypothesis test on the mean and variance of the residuals: at each 
time step t , the null hypothesis 0iHp , corresponding to the normal, fault-free condition of the i -th sensor, is 
tested against the alternative hypothesis 1iHp  corresponding to the faulty sensor.  
The residual signal ie  has the Gaussian distribution ),σm(G jiji , where jim  and jiσ , 0,1j   are respectively 
its mean and standard deviation under the hypothesis jiHp . The decision logic which allows choosing 
between the two hypotheses 0iHp  and 
1
iHp  is based on the value of the log-likelihood ratio )t(λi  in the 
following eq. (4); this is initialized to the value 01 )(λi  at the initial time and is updated as follows, as time 
proceeds (Wald, 1947; Yang et al., 2009): 
2
2
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If the hypothesis 0iHp  is correct, the fourth term of eq. (4) dominates over the third one and the value of 
)t(λi  decreases during time; vice versa, when the correct hypothesis is 1iHp  the value of )t(λi  increases due 
to the effect of the third term. In order to decide whether sensor i  is faulty or not, a value   is fixed for the 
probability of false alarm (sensor i  is considered faulty although it is in normal condition), and a value   is 
fixed for the probability of missed alarm (sensor i  is considered in normal condition although it is faulty). 
An upper UB  and a lower LB  thresholds for )t(λi  are obtained from   and   through eqs. (5) and (6): 
]1[ αβ)(logBU   (5)
]1[ α)(βlogBU   (6)
When )t(λi  exceeds the value UB  a fault to sensor i  is detected, whereas the normal condition is diagnosed 
when the value LB  is reached. After one of the two boundaries is reached, the value of the log-likelihood 
ratio )t(λi  is kept constant until its trend is inverted. 
Constant bias on the sensor measurement if  can be diagnosed by setting 
0
i
1
i σσ   and 00im , whereas to 
detect an increased noise on the sensor measurement one should set 0 0i1i mm . The value of 1im  in the 
first case and of 1iσ  in the second depend on the magnitude of the fault one wishes to detect. Too small 
values of 1im  and 
1
iσ  can lead to false alarms due to the presence of measurement and reconstruction noises 
also in case of normal sensors conditions, whereas too high values lead to the detection of sensor faults only 
when they have high magnitudes. The calibration of the SPRT parameters   ,  , 1im  and 1iσ  is performed 
by a trial and error procedure looking for a trade off between a low rate of false alarms and a low rate of 
undetected faults. 
The fault detection and identification module here implemented is based on the sequential application of the 
SPRT to all sensors and all types of considered faults (in general bias or noise faults). Although in this work 
the case of multiple sensor failures is not considered, the proposed procedure can be extended to deal also 
with this important situation. Also, notice that a fault in the measurement if  may cause some other 
correlated signals to be incorrectly reconstructed and subsequently falsely identified as faulty too; this 
phenomenon is called fault propagation and can lead to a high rate of false alarms in signal validation. Then, 
in case of multiple faults detected by the SPRT, one should verify that they are not a consequence of fault 
propagation. Different techniques have been proposed to tackle the problem of fault propagation. Within an 
ensemble approach to signal validation, the technique proposed in (Chenggang and Bingjing, 2006) based on 
a general sub-grouping technique that uses specially designed intersections between sub-groups to eliminate 
the false alarms caused by fault propagation seems promising.  
5 Case study 
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To verify the applicability of the proposed approach of fault detection, identification and signal 
reconstruction to the measurements used by a controller for deciding which actions to actuate, a simulation 
case study regarding the pressurizer of a PWR nuclear power plant has been considered. 
5.1 Pressurizer model 
Fig. 6 is a schematic representation of the pressurizer system for which a Matlab SIMULINK model has 
been developed, based on the application of the mass and energy conservation equations to the two regions 
of vapour and liquid; exchanges between the two regions, due to evaporation of liquid and condensation of 
steam, are taken into account (Kuridan and Beynon, 1998; Todreas and Kazimi, 1990). The system of non 
linear differential equations describing the model is detailed in the Appendix. 
 
Fig. 6: simplified model of a pressurizer. 
 
The data set X  is built using the signals recorded during different transients, which have been simulated by 
randomly changing the rate of the surge line mass flow entering the pressurizer. All transients are simulated 
starting from the initial conditions reported in Table 1. The surge line mass flow rate depends on the reactor 
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power; in particular, when the Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system pressure or temperature rise, the higher 
pressure or the increase of water volume in the PHT circuit push some coolant from this system into the 
pressurizer (in-surge flow); on the contrary, in case of low PHT system pressure, some liquid moves from the 
pressurizer into the PHT system circuit (out-surge flow). In this application, the transients have been 
generated by assuming surge mass flow rates in the range of [-10; +10] kg/s, positive values indicating in-
surge flow and negative values out-surge flow. In order to represent a realistic situation, the simulations have 
been carried out based on the operational parameters of a standard PWR pressurizer. Moreover the total mass 
of water entering or exiting the pressurizer during a surge line mass flow transient has been related to the 
temperature variations of the coolant in the PHT system. 
Table 1 
Initial conditions of the pressurizer. 
 INITIAL CONDITION 
Level  7.221 m 
Liquid Temperature 342.1 °C 
Vapour Temperature 342.3°C 
Pressure 150.0 bar 
 
During the simulations, the 7n  sensors measuring the signals reported in Table 2 have been considered. 
Table 2 
Measured signals. 
PHYSICAL QUANTITY SYMBOL MEASURED SIGNAL 
Liquid water level L Lf  
Liquid water temperature LT LTf  
Vapour temperature VT VTf  
Pressure P Pf  
Spray mass flow rate spm spf  
Heaters power Q Qf   
Surge line mass flow rate surgem surgef  
 
A block diagram of the model identifying the inputs, state of the system, sensors outputs and controller 
variables is shown in Fig. 7.  
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Fig. 7: inputs, state, controller outputs (gray), controller inputs (black) and sensors outputs of the SIMULINK model of 
the pressurizer. 
 
In order to test the method on pseudo-realistic data, white noise has been added to each signal according to 
engineering considerations on the sensors accuracy (Hashemian, 2004; Hashemian, 2006; Johnson, 2008). 
Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the considered noises.  
Table 3 
Standard deviation of sensors noise. 
 NOISE STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Level Sensor ±0.01 m 
Pressure Sensor ±0.5 bar 
Flow Sensor ±0.2 kg/s 
Power Sensor ±50 kW 
 
5.2 Controller model 
In this application, the control of the level L  and the pressure P  in the pressurizer is achieved through the 
feedback control scheme shown in Fig. 7, which reproduces the scheme used in a standard PWR pressurizer. 
The pressure Pf  and level Lf  are the controlled signals as well as the controller input signals; the sprayers 
mass flow rate spm , the relief valve mass flow rate vlvm , the heaters power Q  and the charging/letdown 
mass flows rates clm  are the controller outputs. More details on the characteristics of the controller 
implemented in this application are described in the Appendix. 
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Fig. 8 reports the noise-free evolution of the seven measured variables during one of the simulated transients. 
The initial state of the system is varied by an out-surge mass flow rate 6surgem  kg/s lasting for 175 s and 
removing from the pressurizer a total mass 970M  kg corresponding to a variation of the PHT system 
temperature of -2 °C. The out-surge flow produces a decrease in the pressure and consequently the heaters 
are turned on so that the pressure decrease is slowed down. When the out-surge flow ends, the heaters drive 
the pressure back to its reference value of RefPf . The loss of liquid in the pressurizer causes the water level 
to decrease until a stabilized value of 686.L   m is reached. The controller intervenes only when the 
absolute value of difference L
Ref
LL ff   between the level reference value and level signal is greater than 
a tolerated error band 2LB  m, which is much larger than the pressure tolerated error band 20.BP   bar. 
In this case, the error L  is equal to 0.06m, as the reference value for the level is 746.f RefL   m for a PHT 
temperature decrease of -2 °C; since  LL B  and the control on the level does not intervene.  
 
Fig. 8: true noise-free values Tif  of the seven measured variables evolving during a plant transient. 
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The actual values of the signals if  measured by the seven sensors during this transient are shown in Fig. 9. 
In this case the measurement noises received by the controller cause the irregular shape of the heaters power 
controller output signal. Notice that the controller inputs signals 
Iif  are the pressure and level signals Pf  
and Lf  of Fig. 9 and not those noise-free of Fig. 8, that represent the true values 
T
Pf  and 
T
Lf  of the physical 
quantities.  
 
Fig. 9: signal values if  actually measured (with noise) during the transient of Fig. 8. 
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and )t(f T )i(F,i IC  indicate the true value of the Ci -th controlled signal in a transient but they result from two 
different controller decision strategies, because based on fault-free and faulty information respectively. 
In this case study, pressure and level sensor faults are simulated by adding a constant bias of magnitude BM  
to the true value Tif  of the signal. For the entire duration of the fault, the measurement produced by sensor 
,i  which usually is given by noiseff Tii  , will then be equal to noiseMff BTii  .  
To illustrate the consequences of a fault on a sensor measuring a controller input signal, the effects on the 
system of the fault reported in Table 4 are considered. 
Table 4 
Pressurizer condition during the faulty transient simulated. 
TRANSIENT TYPE Out-surge [Fig. 8, Fig. 9] 
SURGE LINE MASS FLOW RATE  6surgem  kg/s 
FAULTY SENSOR Pressure sensor 
TYPE OF FAULT Constant bias 
FAULT MAGNITUDE  54.M B   bar 
BEGINNING TIME  50t  s 
 
Fig. 10 compares the evolution of the pressure )t(f TP  (upper) and the level )t(f
T
L  (bottom) signals in 
normal sensor conditions (left) to the evolution of the same two signals )t(f T )P(F,P  and )t(f
T
)P(F,L  in the 
case of the pressure sensor fault of Table 4 (right). Fig. 11 compares, in the same case, the behaviours of the 
two controller output variables used to control the process, i.e. the sprayers mass flow rate (upper) and the 
heaters power (bottom). 
16 
 
Fig. 10: evolution of the pressure (upper) and of the level (bottom) in the pressurizer when all the sensors are in normal 
conditions (left), and when a constant bias fault of +4.5 bar on the pressure measurement is simulated and the measured 
signal Iif is used as input to the controller (right). 
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Fig. 11: evolution of the sprayers mass flow rate (upper) and of the heaters (bottom) in the pressurizer when all the 
sensors are in normal conditions (left), and when a constant bias fault of +4.5 bar on the pressure measurement is 
simulated and the measured signal Iif is used as input to the controller (right). 
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This example demonstrates that the controller can actually take wrong decisions when its inputs are altered 
by a sensor fault. 
5.4 Application  of  the  fault  detection  and  signal  reconstruction 
methodology 
In this Section, the developed model for the fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction is 
described and applied to the case study under analysis.  
5.4.1 Signal validation  
Since the pressurizer operation strongly depends from the pressure and temperature of the PHT system, in 
order to build a more accurate signal validation model the information coming from the seven sensors of the 
pressurizer should be integrated by information related with the PHT system state. In this case study, since 
only the pressurizer and not the complete reactor has been simulated, the variations occurring outside the 
pressurizer are taken into account by considering an additional signal numerically computed as 
 t surgeM d)(f)t(f
0
 , which represents the transfer of mass between the PHT system and the pressurizer 
during a transient.  
The set of )T(nnT 1  signals )Tt(f),...,t(f),t(f iii 1 , 9T , n,...,i 1 , 8n  which are given as 
input to the validation model is made of current and past values of the measured signals listed in Section 
5.1.1 plus the present and past values of Mf  (Fig. 12). 
LEVEL 
( Lf ) 
LIQUID TEMPERATURE  
(
LT
f ) 
VAPOR TEMPERATURE  
(
VT
f ) 
PRESSURE 
( Pf ) 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9
 
SPRAY FLOW 
( spf ) 
HEATERS POWER 
( Qf  ) 
SURGE LINE FLOW 
( surgef ) 
TOTAL MASS OF 
LIQUID  
( Mf ) 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9
Fig. 12: input pattern used for the reconstruction of the current signal measurement. 
 
A set of 70 faults-free transients have been simulated and used for the training of the PCA models, whereas 
10 distinct transients have been used for testing the performance of the proposed approach in order to 
optimize the parameters m , H  and k . The final asset consists of 32H  subsets hF , each one containing 
25m  signals; for each signal, 10 different models reconstructions are aggregated by the LF strategy with 
parameters hiw  and 
h
ib  computed on the basis of 30k  neighbouring training patterns. Notice that in order 
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to reduce the computational time, redundancies higher than 10 have not been considered although they may 
increase the ensemble performance.  
Fig. 13 illustrates how the signal validation strategy presented in Section 2 has been applied to the 
pressurizer case study. The set of seven current measured signals Lf , LTf , VTf , Pf , spf , Qf  , surgef  of 
Table 2 and the additional artificial signal Mf  are completed with their past 9 measurements and sent to the 
signal validation model. For each one of the seven measurements, the reconstruction 1ifˆ , 71,...,i   is 
produced by the ensemble model and compared with the measured value if . The residual ie  is sent to the 
fault detection module where it is processed by means of the SPRT technique. The faults eventually detected 
are corrected by iterating 5iterN  times the reconstruction of the signal. The final reconstruction 5ifˆ  is the 
best available estimate Tifˆ  of the faulty signal true value 
T
if and it is memorized in place of the 
measurement if . If the detected fault concerns the pressure or the level signals, the controller receives in 
input the corresponding reconstructed signal TPfˆ  or 
T
Lfˆ . In any case, the reconstruction 
T
ifˆ  of the faulty 
signal is also included in place of the measured value if  into the patterns sent to the signal validation model 
during the next T  time instants. 
Fig. 13: signal reconstruction strategy for control of the pressurizer of a PWR in the case of a fault of the level sensor 
(black dot). 
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5.4.2 The fault detection and identification module 
The signal validation model produces a reconstruction 1ifˆ , 71,...,i   of each measured signal, which allows 
the fault detection and identification module to recognize the presence of sensor faults (bias or noise), by 
applying the SPRT sequentially to each sensor signal.  
Since in this work we only consider constant bias faults, the standard deviations of all the residuals ie , 
n,...,i 1  are set at the same value 1 0i1i σσ  whereas their mean values under the hypothesis 0iHp  are 
00im . The SPRT parameters ,    and 1im  have been calibrated by a trial and error procedure performed 
on the test set TSTX  after addition of artificial faults, with the goal of compromising between the objective of 
detecting faults of an as small as possible magnitude and in a short time after their occurrence, and that of 
achieving a low rate of false alarms. The values assigned to the mean values of the residuals under 
hypothesis 1iHp  are 11Pm  for a pressure sensor fault, 70.m1L   for a level sensor fault and 41im  for all 
other signals faults. This choice implies a small sensibility of the fault detection module in case of faults 
affecting signals other than the pressure or the level, but it reduces the risk of false alarms due to fault 
propagation. Finally, the false and missed alarm probabilities   and   are set to the values 0050.,  , 
for all sensors. 
Fig. 14 shows the evolution of )t(P  in the case of the pressure sensor fault of Table 4, when the signal 
validation strategy is applied; one can see that during the first time instants, the value of P  resulting from 
the SPRT applied to the pressure sensor decreases until it reaches at 19t  s the lower bound 295.BL   
and thus one can say that the pressure sensor is in normal condition with a degree of confidence 
%.)( 5991   ; at time 50t  s the value of P  quickly increases up to the upper bound 295.BU   and 
the fault is detected with a probability of %.50  of being a false alarm; from the detection time on, the 
controller receives in input the reconstructed value TPfˆ  of the pressure signal. 
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Fig. 14: evolution of )t(P  during the transient of Table 4 where a fault is added to the pressure sensor measurement. 
 
5.4.3 The signal reconstruction module 
Once again the pressure sensor fault of Table 4 is used to illustrate the improvements which can be obtained 
by reconstructing the faulty signals after the fault has been detected by the SPRT. Fig. 15 compares the 
evolution of the true pressure and level signals values, )t(f TP  and )t(f
T
L  respectively, in the case of normal 
sensors conditions (left) and in the case of the fault affecting the pressure measurement, when applying the 
fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction modules (right). Fig. 16 compares, in the same case, 
the behaviours of the heaters; the sprayers mass flow rate is in both cases almost always zero, and thus it is 
not shown here. Notice that, even if a sensor fault has occurred, the evolutions of all signals and in particular 
of the true pressure and level signals, )t(f T )P(F,P  and )t(f
T
)P(F,L , are very similar to those obtained in case 
of normal sensors conditions. 
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Fig. 15: evolution of the pressure (upper) and of the level (bottom) in the pressurizer when all the sensors are in normal 
conditions (left), and when a constant bias fault of +4.5 bar on the pressure measurement is simulated and the measured 
signal TiIfˆ is used as input to the controller (right). 
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Fig. 16: evolution of the sprayers mass flow rate (upper) and of the heaters (bottom) in the pressurizer when all the 
sensors are in normal conditions (left), and when a constant bias fault of +4.5 bar on the pressure measurement is 
simulated and the measured signal TiIfˆ is used as input to the controller (right). 
 
5.4.4 Comparison  of  the  results  obtained with  or without  fault  detection, 
identification and signal reconstruction 
Assuming as reference the behaviour of the controller when all sensors are in normal conditions, the 
consequences of a fault to sensor Ii  with successive fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction 
are compared to those without. The deviation )t(f)t(f)t(d T )i(F,i
T
ii ICCC   of the true value of the Ci -th 
controlled signal in case of normal sensor conditions TiCf  and in case of fault 
T
)i(F,i ICf  is considered. In 
particular two performance indicators are evaluated, providing local (eq.(7)) and integral (eq.(8)) information 
about the effects of the fault on the controlled system, respectively (the lower the indicators, the better the 
controller performance): 
][ )t(dmaxMd
CC iti
  (7)

f
CC
t
t
i
f
i dt)t(d)tt(
Id
0
2
0
][1  (8)
Table 5 reports the performance indicators for the transient with a fault of the pressure sensor of Table 4, in 
the case with or without fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction. 
Table 5 
Comparison of the performance indicators values in case the fault detection, identification and reconstruction is applied or 
not. 
 NO FAULT DETECTION, 
IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNAL 
RECONSTRUCTION 
FAULT DETECTION, 
IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNAL 
RECONSTRUCTION 
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LMd        7810.  m 0020.  m 
PId          
310042 .  bar 310050 .  bar 
LId          
210713 .  m 0070.  m 
 
As expected, the performance indicators are significantly lower (better) in the case in which fault detection, 
identification and signal reconstruction is applied, thus indicating that the objectives of the control system 
are better satisfied, i.e. the controlled variables values are kept closer to their setpoints. 
To confirm these results a number of other system faults have been analyzed (Table 6 and Table 7 for the 
faults of the pressure and level sensors, respectively). To verify the controller performance under different 
operative conditions of the pressurizer, eight transients have been considered, keeping the surge line mass 
flow rate at the constant value 6Tsurgef  kg/s (in-surge) or 6Tsurgef  kg/s (out-surge) for different time 
durations. For each transient, the total mass of liquid entering or exiting the pressurizer, i.e., the integral of 
the surge line mass flow rate over the entire duration of the transient, reflects a variation of the PHT water 
temperature ranging from -4 to +4 °C. 
Table 6 
Pressurizer condition during the simulated faulty transients. 
FAULTY SENSOR Pressure sensor 
TYPE OF FAULT Constant bias with 16 different fault magnitude values 
FAULT MAGNITUDE  ]090654035101750450[ ........M B   bar 
BEGINNING TIME  50t  s
 
Table 7 
Pressurizer condition during the simulated faulty transients. 
FAULTY SENSOR Level sensor 
TYPE OF FAULT Constant bias with 16 different fault magnitude values 
FAULT MAGNITUDE  ]512101750500350200100[ ........M B   m 
BEGINNING TIME  50t  s 
 
In particular, two tests have been performed by considering:  
1) the 16 sensor faults of Table 6 and Table 7 occur during each of the eight pressurizer transients; 
2) as in 1) but applying fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction. 
To evaluate the performance in test 2, the delay time   necessary to detect the fault after its occurrence is 
considered. Fig. 17 shows the mean value of the delay times obtained in the eight transients simulated for 
each fault magnitude, in case of pressure (left) or level (right) fault. 
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Fig. 17: mean fault detection time delay vs fault magnitude. 
 
One can notice that as the fault magnitude BM  gets smaller, the detection time   increases until the fault is 
too small to be detected; in particular, faults to the pressure sensor with an absolute value of their magnitude 
lower than 501.M B   bar are not detected; similarly, faults of the level sensor with an absolute value of 
their magnitude lower than 750.M B   m are not detected. The numerical values of the mean time delays   
before detecting the faults are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Mean fault detection time delay τ  for the smallest detectable faults. 
FAULT BM  TIME DELAY τ  
-1.5 bar 192 s 
+1.5 bar 22 s 
-0.75 m  37 s 
+0.75 m  591 s 
 
In tests 1 and 2, for each values of the fault magnitude BM  affecting signal Iif , the performance indicator 
CiMd  is computed as the maximum of )t(d Ci  over the eight simulated transients, whereas a mean integral 
cost indicator CiId  is obtained by averaging the eight performance indicators CiId  obtained for each 
transient.  
Fig. 18 shows the values of the performance indicators PMd  (upper left), LMd  (upper right), PId  (bottom 
left) and LId  (bottom right) in correspondence of different values of the pressure sensor fault magnitude 
BM  in the case in which fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction is applied (test 2, 
continuous line) or not (test 1, dotted line); notice that the maximum (worst) values of the performance 
indicators in test 2 are obtained in case of faults of small magnitude due to the fact that these faults are not 
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detected or are detected with a significant time delay  : thus, the signal reconstruction module is not 
working for the entire duration of the fault or for its first   time instants. 
Similar results are shown in Fig. 20 in the case of level sensor faults. Since the tolerated error band 2LB  
m is quite large, the faults of magnitude included in the interval ]0121[ ..M B   m have no consequences 
on the correct control of the process.  
These results confirm that the sensor diagnostic procedure integrated in the controller of the PWR pressurizer 
allows improving significantly the control of the process not only in some critical local points as stated by 
the 
CiMd  indicators, but also during the entire transient as demonstrated by the CiId  integral indicators.  
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Fig. 18: PMd (upper left), LMd  (upper right), PId  (bottom left) and LId  (bottom right) indicators versus the 
magnitude BM  of the constant bias fault added to the pressure measurement. 
 
 
 
-5-9 -0.75     0.75 5 9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fault magnitude MB (m)
M
d P
 (
ba
r)
 
 
-5-9 -0.75     0.75 5 9
0
1
2
3
Fault magnitude MB (m)
M
d L
 (
m
)
No fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction (test 1)
Fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction (test 2)
-5 0 5
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
Fault magnitude MB (m)
Id
P 
(b
ar
)
 
 
-5 0 5
0
250
500
750
Fault magnitude MB (m)
Id
L 
(m
)
No fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction (test 1)
Fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction (test 2)
l l
28 
 
 
Fig. 19: PMd (upper left), LMd  (upper right), PId  (bottom left) and LId  (bottom right) indicators versus the 
magnitude BM  of the constant bias fault added to the level measurement. 
 
5.5 Results discussion 
The results presented in this Section demonstrate that with the fault detection, identification and signal 
reconstruction approach proposed it is possible to effectively control the pressurizer when a fault occurs on 
the pressure or level sensors, in the sense that the controlled variables obtained using the reconstructed 
signals do not diverge from their setpoints and the system behaviour is kept similar to the one under normal, 
fault-free sensors operation. 
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Faults of different magnitudes within a given range have been simulated to verify these results; larger faults 
magnitudes would not have been realistic. Only the results obtained for the constant bias fault type have been 
presented; nevertheless, similar results have been achieved also in the case of noise-type faults. 
The entire fault detection, identification and reconstruction procedure requires about 0.3 s for the elaboration 
of each measurement performed with a standard personal computer; the delay thus introduced in the 
controller decision is compatible with the typical time constant of a pressurizer and does not affect the 
effective control of the system. 
The constant values of +6 kg/s in case of in-surge or -6 kg/s for the out-surge assigned to the surge line mass 
flow rate have not been chosen too high in order to avoid falling in a region not represented by the training 
patterns used to train the model; if the surge line mass flow rate and at the same time the total mass of liquid 
entering the pressurizer have high values, the pressure and level can take too high (in-surge) or too low (out-
surge) values, which are not represented by any pattern of the training set. In this case, the measurements 
cannot be reconstructed properly by the model which would be extrapolating its reconstructions. 
Another case in which the model looses its validity is when the charging/letdown mass flows rates are 
different from zero. During standard transients the controller does not need to act on the charging/letdown 
flows; as a consequence, all training patterns have charging/letdown mass flow rates equal to zero and thus 
the signal has not been used to build the model. In some particular cases, for example in case of level sensor 
faults, a controller action on the charging/letdown flows might take place; this situation is not handled by the 
current set up of the approach. 
In all these cases, the diagnostic system should signal that the measurements are out of the range of validity 
of the model and that the methodology should not be applied. 
For lower values of the surge line mass flow rate, it has been verified that the consequences of faults are 
smaller and at the same time the proposed approach work best because the measured signals fall in the region 
with the highest density of training patterns, where the signal validation model is more accurate. 
6 Conclusions  
An approach for the detection and identification of faulty sensors and the reconstruction of their erroneous 
measurements has been proposed. The effectiveness of the approach in increasing the performance of system 
control when a fault affects the controller input signals is confirmed by the results obtained from its 
application to the control of a PWR pressurizer. 
The reconstruction provided by the signal validation and reconstruction model described in Section 3 
provides good estimates of the true values of the measured variables and can be used for control. 
The boundaries of operation of the proposed approach are defined by the region in which the training 
patterns fall; techniques exist to warn when the pattern under reconstruction is outside such region and is 
thus, no longer reliable (Fantoni et al., 1997). 
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The case of simultaneous presence of multiple faults has not been considered: future work should test the 
approach in this situation. Also, the problem of fault propagation has not been tackled directly: the definition 
of a refined strategy for the distinction of false alarms will be considered in future research. 
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Appendix A 
Acronyms 
k-nn = k-nearest neighbors 
LF = Local Fusion 
PCA = Principal Components Analysis 
PID = Proportional Integral Derivative 
PHT = Primary Heat Transfert 
PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor 
RFSE = Random Feature Selection Ensemble 
SPRT = Sequential Probability Ratio Test 
Nomenclature 
Signals: 
n  Total number of sensors’ signals available 
Cn  Total number of controlled signal  
In  Total number of controller input signal 
if  Sensor measurement 
ifˆ  Estimate of the i -th sensor measurement provided by a model 
jifˆ  Estimate of the i -th sensor measurement provided by a model at the j -th iteration of the reconstruction 
Tif  True value of the physical quantity measured by the i -th sensor 
Tifˆ  Final reconstruction of Tif  
T )i(F,i ICf  True value of the Ci -th controlled signal in case of fault of the Ii -th controller input signal  
Signal Validation: 
X  Data set 
TRNX  Training data subset 
TSTX  Test data subset 
N  Total number of signal patterns 
TRNN  Number of training patterns 
TSTN  Number of test patterns 
hF  Subset of signals 
m  Number of signals in each subsets hF  
H  Total number of models 
iH  Number of models reconstructing the i -th signal 
hifˆ  Reconstruction made by the h -th model of the i -th signal 
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TRNQ  Subset of training patterns similar to the test pattern, also called neighborhood of the test pattern 
k  Cardinality of the neighborhood TRNQ  
hQ,i TRNmae  Mean absolute error of the h -th model in the reconstruction of the i -th signal of the patterns in the set 
TRNQ  
hQ,i TRNme  Mean error of the h -th model in the reconstruction of the i -th signal of the patterns in the set TRNQ  
hib  Bias correction associated to the h -th model for the reconstruction of the i -th signal 
hiw  Weight associated to the h -th model for the reconstruction of the i -th signal 
Fault detection: 
0iHp  Hypothesis of i -th sensor being in normal condition 
1iHp  Hypothesis of i -th sensor being in faulty condition 
 )t(fˆ)t(f)t(e 1iii  Residual signal  
jim  Mean value of the residual ie  under the hypothesis jiHp , 10,j   
ji  Standard deviation of the residual ie  under the hypothesis jiHp , 10,j   
  False alarm probability 
  Missed alarm probability 
 ]))(logBU 1[  Upper thresholds for )t(λi  
 ]1[ )(logBL   Lower thresholds for )t(λi  
)t(i  Log likelihood ratio of the residual ie    Delay time necessary for fault detection 
Control: 

CCC i
Ref
ii ff Distance between the measured value of the Ci -th controlled signal and its reference value 
iB  Band of tolerated error i  

Cid  deviation )t(f)t(f
T
)i(F,i
T
i ICC   of the true Ci -th signal in case of sensor fault and in case of normal sensor 
conditions. 
 ])t(dmaxMd
CC iti
[  Local performance indicator computed for the Ci -th signal 
 
f
CC
t
t
i
f
i dt)t(d)tt(
Id
0
2
0
][1  Integral performance indicator computed for the Ci -th signal 
PWR pressurizer model: 
P  Pressure Lh  Enthalpy of the liquid in the pressurizer Vh  Enthalpy of the vapour in the pressurizer surgeh  Enthalpy of the surge line liquid water 
clh  Enthalpy of the charging/letdown liquid water sph  Enthalpy of the sprayers liquid water 
)P(hF  Enthalpy of the liquid in saturation condition at pressure P  )P(hG  Enthalpy of the vapour in saturation condition at pressure P  )h,P(T LL  Temperature of the liquid )h,P(T VV  Temperature of the vapour )P(TF  Temperature of the liquid in saturation condition at pressure P  
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 FG T)P(T  Temperature of the vapour in saturation condition at pressure P  V  Volume of the pressurizer VV  Volume of the vapour in the pressurizer  VL VVV  Volume of the liquid in the pressurizer S  Surface of the pressurizer horizontal section  S/VL L  Level of the liquid water in the pressurizer 
Q  Heaters power )h,P( LL  Density of the liquid water in the pressurizer )h,P( VV  Density of the vapour in the pressurizer 
)h,P( FF  Density of the liquid water in saturated conditions at pressure P  )h,P( GG  Density of the vapour in saturated conditions at pressure P  
vlvm  Relief valve mass flow rate  surgem  Surge line mass flow rate 
spm  Sprayers mass flow rate  


)hh(
)hh(
mm
FG
spF
spcs   Mass flow rate of the steam condensed by the sprayers 
flm  Liquid flashes mass flow rate  
rom  Condensing steam mass flow rate  clm  Charging/letdown mass flow rate  h  Heat transfer coefficient 
0P  Pressure initial condition 0VV  Vapour volume initial condition 
0surgeT  Initial condition of the surge line water temperature 
0clT  Initial condition of the charging/letdown water temperature 
0spT  Initial condition of the sprayers’ water temperature 
)T,P(h surgesurge 000  Initial condition of the surge line water enthalpy 
)T,P(h clcl 000  Initial condition of the charging/letdown water enthalpy 
)T,P(h spsp 000  Initial condition of the sprayers’ water enthalpy 
0LT  Initial condition of the pressurizer liquid water temperature 
0VT  Initial condition of the vapour temperature 
)T,P(h LL 000  Initial condition of the pressurizer liquid water enthalpy 
)T,P(h VV 000  Initial condition of the vapour enthalpy 
Appendix B 
Pressurizer model equations: 
The pressurizer model is designed to handle the four possible situations listed in Table B.1. 
Table B.1 
Liquid water and vapour conditions in the four situations tackled by the SIMULINK pressurizer model. 
CASE LIQUID WATER CONDITION 
VAPOUR 
CONDITION 
A Subcooled Overheated 
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B Saturated Overheated 
C Subcooled Saturated 
D Saturated Saturated 
 
Each situation is represented by a different dynamic model of the pressurizer described by the system of differential 
equations  zΨ , where Ψ  is the coefficients matrix,  is the inputs vector  and z  is the state variables vector. 
The elements of Ψ ,   and z  are here detailed for each situation considered. 
 
Case A. FL hh   and  GV hh   




















LVV
VVV
L
L
VL
L
V
V
V
VV
V
V
)VV()VV(
VV
h
)VV(
P
)VV(
h
V
P
V




00
00
0
0
Ψ ,  









L
V
V
h
h
V
P
z , 













)TT(SQ)hh(m)hh(m)hh(m)hh(m
)TT(S)hh(m
 m mmm
mm
LVhLGcsLclclLspspLsurgesurge
LVhGVcs
clspsurgecs
csvlv






 
(B.1)
Case B.   FL hh   and  GV hh   
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Case C.   FL hh   and  GV hh   
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Case D.   FL hh   and  GV hh   
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Notice that the elements of the coefficients’ matrix Ψ  depend from the state variables so that the model is nonlinear. In 
practice at each time step the SIMULINK model checks in which one of the four possible cases the pressurizer is and 
evaluates the coefficients’ matrix Ψ according to values of the state variables at the previous time step. 
Appendix C 
Pressurizer control scheme: 
The main function of a pressurizer is that of maintaining the pressure in the primary system of the plant at the reference 
value (150 bar) to give adequate overpressure, suppress pump cavitations and avoid bulk boiling. The pressurizer is also 
designed to accommodate normal volume surges. The level L  of the liquid water contained in it must also be 
controlled in order to avoid emptying or overfilling its volume.  
In order to allow this component to fulfil its functions, it is necessary to continuously control that the value of the water 
level L  and the pressure P  in the pressurizer agree with the desired reference value RefLf  and
Ref
Pf . Fig. C.1 shows 
how decisions are generated by the controller.  
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Fig C.1: pressurizer control scheme 
 
The pressure measurement Pf  is compared with the constant pressure setpoint of 150 bar, whereas the measured value 
of the level Lf  is compared with a reference value which varies according with the variation of the temperature in the 
PHT system. The controller intervenes only if the controlled signal Ci , which is at the same time a controller input 
signal, differs from its reference value RefiCf  of a quantity greater than the tolerated error band, here set to the values 
20.BP   bar for the pressure and 2LB  m for the level. Notice that a stricter control condition is applied to the 
pressure than to the level. When one of the tolerated error band is exceeded, the difference 
CCC i
Ref
ii ff   between 
the measured signal and its reference value is given in input to a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller which 
generates the control signal for the corresponding actuator, i.e., the charging/letdown flows, the sprayers or the heaters. 
The relief valve, instead, is a safety device which opens only when the pressure exceeds a limit value (here set equal to 
165maxP  bar) and has a constant mass flow rate. 
In case of low pressure, the heaters are turned on. For a more precise control of the supplied power only one out of five 
heaters can deliver variable PID controlled power, whereas the other four units are back-up heaters run by control 
relays. All units have a maximum power of 320 kW each. The pressure is increased as a consequence of the greater 
mass flow rate flm  generated by liquid water flashes produced by warming up the liquid water. If the pressure is 
getting too high the control signal generated by the corresponding PID is sent to the sprayers which start injecting 
nebulised water into the pressurizer with a maximum mass flow rate of 7 kg/s. The flow of nebulised cold water coming 
from the sprayers causes the condensation of the steam, thus inducing a pressure decrease. In a similar way, the 
deviations of the level from the reference value RefLf  are controlled by regulating the charging/letdown mass flows 
rates. 
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